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When judicially reviewing administrative action, it is common (nay, even customary) 
for courts to disclaim a role in judging the merits of any underlying government policy. 
Examples are legion, but take this one from the decision of the High Court in New 
Health New Zealand Inc v South Taranaki District Council: 
It is important to make it clear at the outset that this judgment is not required to 
pronounce on the merits of fluoridation. The issues I am required to address 
concern the power of a local body to fluoridate drinking water supply. That is 
a legal question.1 
Even if no one wholly believes disclaimers of this kind, they nevertheless provide a 
certain reassurance. Judges may be no more capable than the rest of us to disregard 
entirely their policy preferences. But the attempt to do so imposes a useful discipline. 
It reminds the judge (as well as their audience) of the judge’s position in the separation 
of powers; of their distinct and independent role in ensuring that government decisions 
are exercised in accordance with law. 
Consider in this light the opening paragraph of Borrowdale v Director-General of 
Health.2 The Court began by reciting the tragic background to the COVID-19 pandemic 
and the challenge it poses to public health systems around the world. The measures 
imposed globally, said the Court, have often attracted deep controversy. On one thing, 
however, most commentators agree: “The decisions taken by the New Zealand 
government in March this year to ‘go hard and go early’ were the right ones.” 
Gone, then, are the traditional reassurances about judicial neutrality in matters of 
government policy. In their place, the judges offer up a reassurance of an altogether 
different kind. “We, too”, they seem to want to tell us, “are playing for the team of five 
million”. 
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To be fair, one can understand the impulse. In a previous commentary on the legality 
of the lockdown, we likewise began by expressing policy support for the lockdown.3 
This was more than just an attempt to shield ourselves from criticism. It stemmed from 
concerns over destabilising the fragile social consensus on which the success of the 
lockdown rested. McLean notes that such hesitations were shared widely: 
[A]cademic lawyers had been reluctant publicly to air their views and 
misgivings about the legal bases for the measures, even if they appeared to be 
broadly in agreement with the measures themselves. Public interventions risked 
presenting the law and legal expertise in its worst light – the vehicle of pedants 
who are unable to see the “bigger picture” or participate fully in “Team New 
Zealand”.4 
But, then, we are just academics. It is not our role to “do right to all manner of people 
after the laws and usages of New Zealand without fear or favour”,5 be they lockdown 
sceptics, conspiracy theorists6 or legislative drafters with a concern for the rule of law. 
In comparison, the Borrowdale Court’s belying of its prehearing claim that “the Court 
does not engage in nor provide answers to political, social or economic questions”7 
tells us everything we need to know about the compromised position of judges when 
adjudicating the legality of an exercise of emergency powers.8 As Dyzenhaus has 
stated, “the judicial record in enforcing the rule of law in [emergency] situations is at 
worst, dismal, and at best ambiguous”.9 
Understanding this point, we hypothesised that judges would be slow to uphold any 
legal challenge to the lockdown.10 Perhaps, therefore, what we should find most 
surprising about the High Court’s decision in Borrowdale is that it actually held that 
restrictive measures applied during the first nine days of the lockdown were unlawful.11 
This finding was not a mere technicality. It constituted an important and timely 
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reminder that, even in times of emergency, coercive government action must have a 
clear basis in law: “In this country, amid the clash of arms, the laws are not silent.”12 
Nevertheless, in this brief commentary, we suggest two things. The first is that the 
overall result in Borrowdale was predicated on a high degree of deference to executive 
power. The second is that this is regrettable. It constitutes a dangerous precedent 
available to future governments regardless of the merits of the underlying measures. 
NEW ZEALAND’S FIRST COVID-19 LOCKDOWN 
The background to the Borrowdale litigation was well summarised by Rodriguez 
Ferrere in this journal’s previous issue.13 Nevertheless, we traverse it briefly. 
On 21 March 2020, Cabinet announced an “alert level” system to guide New Zealand’s 
response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Three days later, the country moved to “Alert 
Level 4” – the highest level – initiating a lockdown in which social and economic life 
was reduced to a bare minimum. 
The alert level system had no independent legal basis. Rather, the lockdown was 
effected by an “epidemic notice” under the Epidemic Preparedness Act 2006 (NZ) and 
a declaration of a state of national emergency under the Civil Defence and Emergency 
Management Act 2002 (NZ). These two steps triggered a range of executive powers. 
Most significantly for our purposes, they unlocked a set of coercive powers reposed in 
medical officers of health under s 70 of the Health Act 1956 (NZ). Those powers can 
be exercised on a nationwide basis by New Zealand’s Director-General of Health so 
long as the incumbent has suitable public health expertise.14 
On the day the Level 4 Lockdown commenced, the Director-General relied on 
s 70(1)(m) of the Health Act to order the closure of all non-residential premises, except 
for those expressly exempted.15 He also prohibited people from congregating in 
outdoor places of amusement or recreation unless they remained two metres apart 
(Order 1). 
Over the next week or so, however, various public statements issued by the leaders of 
the government’s COVID-19 response appeared to impose far greater limits on civil 
liberties than those found in Order 1. New Zealanders were directed to stay home in 
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their residential “bubbles”, to receive no visitors and to venture out only for essential 
purposes (such as supermarket shopping and brief localised exercise). 
On 3 April, the Director-General moved to address this discrepancy. He purported to 
issue a new notice under s 70(1)(f) of the Health Act, which empowers a medical 
officer of health to require persons to be isolated or quarantined. On this basis, the 
Director-General ordered that all persons in New Zealand remain in their residences 
except for “essential personal movement” as defined in the notice (Order 2).16 
When New Zealand moved to Alert Level 3 a few weeks later, the Director-General 
issued a replacement notice in reliance on both statutory paragraphs (Order 3).17 Some 
restrictions were relaxed but the country remained, in essence, in lockdown. 
On 13 May, New Zealand moved to Alert Level 2. This brought the lockdown to an 
end (although some restrictions, such as on mass gatherings, remained). The same day, 
bespoke legislation came into effect, putting the government’s powers to respond to 
the COVID-19 pandemic on a more secure legal footing.18 
It is against this background that Andrew Borrowdale mounted his challenge to the 
lockdown’s legality. 
THE FIRST NINE DAYS 
Borrowdale’s first cause of action concerned the lockdown’s first nine days, prior to 
the making of Order 2. It was the only cause of action to succeed. 
As noted above, during this period senior government officials (including the Prime 
Minister and Commissioner of the Police) made a series of public statements directing 
the public to stay at home and remain isolated in their “bubbles” on pain of coercive 
consequences, although that was not what Order 1 in fact required. Borrowdale argued 
that these announcements constituted a limit on rights protected by the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ) (NZBORA), including the freedoms of association, 
movement and assembly. That brought s 5 of that Act into play. It requires limits on 
rights to be both “prescribed by law” and “demonstrably justified”. Borrowdale 
conceded the latter but contested the former.19 
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The High Court agreed – in our view, correctly. Over that nine-day period, figures of 
authority stood repeatedly at the Beehive Podium (and elsewhere), directing the public 
in peremptory language to minimise their movement and contact with others. 
Government websites echoed that instruction. These official statements were, it is true, 
peppered with the language of request.20 But they were also, as the High Court put it, 
“replete with commands” and backed up by explicit threats of criminal sanction.21 They 
were delivered with “the full authority of [the Prime Minister’s] office and the State”.22 
Some have suggested the High Court’s conclusion on this point was “finely 
balanced”.23 We do not read the decision so. On the substance of the matter, the Court 
was unequivocal. The government’s pronouncements “created the overwhelming 
impression that compliance was required by law – indeed, that is how [the judges 
themselves] interpreted them at the time”.24 As Order 1 did not in fact go so far, these 
pronouncements had the effect of limiting the relevant rights without lawful 
authority.25 
Where the Court hesitated was in deciding whether to grant relief.26 Ultimately, 
however, it decided “that in times of emergency the courts’ constitutional role in 
keeping a weather eye on the rule of law assumes particular importance”27 and so 
issued a formal declaration. In doing so (and thus rejecting the Crown’s attempts to 
rewrite the history of the early period of New Zealand’s lockdown as involving only 
“voluntary” compliance with governmental “advice”), the Borrowdale Court affirmed 
the role of law in constraining the operation of emergency power. This is less obvious 
than it seems. It constitutes a timely rejection of the Lockean (and Schmittean) view 
that legality has no role to play in times of emergency.28 
For a number of reasons, however, issuing the declaration was a relatively safe move 
for the Borrowdale Court. First, the police had recognised that Order 1 did not in fact 
require people to “stay at home”,29 so had not mounted any prosecutions for failing to 
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do so during the relevant period. Secondly, the lockdown had long since ended by the 
time the decision was handed down, and bespoke legislation had been enacted to enable 
any future COVID-19-related lockdowns. Finally, the Court issued the declaration in 
terms that were particularly sympathetic to the government’s position: 
While there is no question that the requirement [to stay at home] was a 
necessary, reasonable and proportionate response to the COVID-19 crisis at 
that time, the requirement was not prescribed by law and was therefore contrary 
to the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act.30 
That language, together with the Court’s explicit plea to “keep our conclusion in 
perspective”,31 helped to frame the government’s response to the judgment: that it had 
simply been “trying to educate people about the health risks and transition them quickly 
to take actions that curtailed normal freedoms like staying at home to stop the spread 
of the virus”.32 
As such, on this point the Court may be seen to have done the minimum necessary to 
meet its constitutional duty. On the remaining claims we think it did even less. 
THE ULTRA VIRES ARGUMENT 
The second cause of action had the broadest implications. Borrowdale argued that all 
three orders were ultra vires, rendering the lockdown unlawful from inception to 
conclusion. He marshalled several arguments to support this claim. For want of space, 
we confine ourselves to the one we find most compelling: that s 70(1)(f) of the Health 
Act (empowering a medical officer of health to “require persons … to be isolated, 
quarantined, or disinfected”) did not authorise the Director-General to order the entire 
country into lockdown.33 
The arguments for and against Borrowdale’s reading of s 70(1)(f) have been rehearsed 
by academics (including ourselves) on several occasions.34 We continue to see 
considerable strength in Borrowdale’s arguments.35 The common law “principles of 
legality” are not only concerned with the need for clarity when removing civil and 
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political rights36 but also, relevantly, with the desirability of criminal liability being 
specified in clear terms. That latter presumption is no longer thought (as it once was) 
to justify a strained reading of legislative language, but still requires resolving genuine 
doubt about the meaning and purpose of a penal provision in favour of an accused.37 
Section 70(1) of the Health Act constitutes a statutory delegation to a health official of 
the power to impose criminal liability.38 Its proper scope surely merits careful attention 
on that basis alone. 
In our view, the statutory language also needs to be interpreted in the light of the sheer 
improbability that Parliament would have deliberately reposed a power to lock down 
the entire country in a single (unelected) health official. In the words of Lord Shaw in 
R v Halliday (dissenting): “[I]f Parliament had intended to make this colossal 
delegation of power it would have done so plainly and courageously.”39 
Against that background, the terms “isolation” and “quarantine” are not, in our view, 
apt to describe a lockdown of the entire nation.40 The absence of any publication 
requirement in s 70(1)(f) is also highly revealing. By contrast, a s 70(1)(m) direction 
(to close premises or avoid congregating) is described in the statute as an “order” and 
must be “published or broadcast to the public”.41 The significance of that contrast is, 
again, underlined by the fact that a s 70(1) direction is constitutive of criminal liability. 
Adequate notification to affected individuals is therefore integral to the rule of law. 
For that reason, we regard the contrasting notification requirements in s 70(1)(f) and 
(m) as of considerable interpretive import. The assumption built into s 70(1)(f) is that 
the act of “requiring” particular individuals to “isolate” or “quarantine” will itself 
constitute sufficient notice to them. Notification to the world at large is therefore 
redundant. The Court’s response to this point – reading in a requirement that a 
s 70(1)(f) order involve “a written order with at least a degree of formality” if it is to 
apply on a nationwide basis42 – not only neglects the underlying interpretive 
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significance of the contrasting language but also seems, to us, dangerously close to 
judicial legislation. 
Nevertheless, we accept that the language of s 70(1)(f) is at least capable of being 
interpreted in the manner the Director-General contended. As Rodriguez Ferrere 
suggests, Borrowdale’s second cause of action thus stood or fell depending on the High 
Court’s general interpretive stance.43 On that point, the Borrowdale Court was explicit. 
The context of these particular emergency powers dictates a “fair, liberal, and remedial 
construction” rather than the “more narrow and literal approach to the text” that might 
“ordinarily” be dictated by a statute that limits rights.44 That veiled reference to an 
alternative “narrow and literal” approach is the only mention in the decision of the 
common law principles of legality referred to above. 
We respectfully suggest that a very liberal approach displaying marked deference to 
the executive branch was required for the Court to reach its desired conclusion. In 
adopting that stance, the Borrowdale Court aligned itself with a long common law 
tradition of judicial deference in moments of national emergency.45 To be fair, there 
are some legitimate reasons to ground that approach. In a moment of emergency, the 
Executive must move quickly to counter an existential threat – often in reliance on 
legal tools that were designed with the last crisis in mind and that are not fit for 
purpose.46 The courts, by contrast, suffer from a lack of relevant information and 
expertise, from an inability to adjudicate polycentric problems, and from a legitimacy 
deficit stemming from their comparative lack of political accountability.47 For these 
reasons among others, there is a long philosophical and jurisprudential tradition 
questioning the role of law in constraining emergency powers.48 
We are not, however, alone in rejecting that tradition.49 Dyzenhaus, for example, argues 
that judges have a constitutional duty to uphold the rule of law in times of emergency.50 
He advocates for a “virtuous cycle of legality”51 in which all three branches of 
government “cooperate in devising controls on public actors which ensure that their 
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decisions comply with the principle of legality, understood as a substantive conception 
of the rule of law”.52 
In our view, the highly deferential approach taken by the Borrowdale Court attracts a 
number of interrelated objections. The first is that the Court’s insistence on the 
normative correctness of the lockdown measures disguises the fact that the precedent 
of interpretive generosity may now be brought to the aid of a less principled or less 
competent regime wielding draconian emergency powers. This is by no means far-
fetched. As Ip puts it: “During times of emergency, those charged with protecting 
national security and public safety have exhibited a historical tendency to overreact.”53 
There is also a long history of pretextual reliance on emergency powers, whether it be 
in apartheid South Africa, the rise of Nazi Germany, or throughout the sorry history of 
British colonialism.54 Within that story, judicial precedent plays a noteworthy (if not 
always salutary) role. Lee has, for example, documented widespread reliance on the 
majority decision in Liversidge v Anderson55 by Commonwealth judges operating 
under authoritarian regimes “to cloak their unwillingness or lack of judicial courage to 
provide effective judicial oversight of the exercise of preventive detention powers”.56 
The Borrowdale Court might respond that, in one respect at least, its interpretive 
generosity was made expressly contingent on the normative justifiability of the relevant 
measures. The Court held, on an orthodox application of R v Hansen,57 that s 6 of the 
NZBORA (requiring legislation to be interpreted consistently with the Act where 
possible) was not engaged because the orders did not unjustifiably limit rights in terms 
of s 5.58 
It is unclear whether the Court also considered a prior finding of unjustifiable rights 
infringement necessary before applying the common law principles of legality as the 
Bench simply did not discuss this matter.59 There are, however, at least two objections 
to that approach. The first is that a clear statement rule plays an important part in 
Dyzenhaus’ “virtuous cycle of legality” because it “forces the executive to bring its 
activity within the scope of a deliberately and democratically designed statutory 
regime, one which has at least the potential of providing rule-of-law teeth”.60 That role 
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is independent from, and should not be contingent on, any questions of normative 
justification.61 
The second is that a judicial assessment of normative justifiability is a dangerous 
gatekeeper indeed for robust judicial scrutiny in an emergency context.62 Experience 
tells us that it is in relation to the substantive grounds of review (reasonableness and 
proportionality) that courts tend to be most deferential in times of emergency. This is 
for good reason: it is here that the normative justifications for deference (such as 
polycentricity and lack of judicial information/expertise) are at their strongest.63 By 
contrast, those reasons provide far less support for a deferential approach to the 
construction of statutory language. This is, in our view, another reason why clear 
statement rules have an important role to play in the constraint of emergency powers. 
In practice, they may be all that is available.64 
Finally, we sympathise with the plight of the Ardern Government at the start of the 
lockdown as it scrambled to respond to a looming crisis in reliance on a flawed and 
largely untried legislative regime. However, the Court’s sympathy for that plight could 
have been far more appropriately reflected at the remedies stage. It is also important to 
remember that New Zealand has one of the most responsive Parliaments in the world. 
Urgent amending legislation could have been passed at any time including, if 
necessary, with retrospective or validating effect (at least with respect to any issues of 
civil liability).65 While that approach is not without its own problems from a rule of 
law perspective, it is infinitely preferable to the dilution of principles of legislative 
construction that we see reflected in the Borrowdale decision. A legislative response 
galvanises what we think should be the primary mechanisms of accountability during 
an emergency: parliamentary supervision and public scrutiny. 
AN UNLAWFUL DELEGATION? 
The rejection of Borrowdale’s third cause of action illustrates further the High Court’s 
highly deferential stance. 
The argument concerned the processes by which essential businesses – those allowed 
to remain open during the lockdown – were identified. Section 70(1)(m) stipulates that 
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a medical officer of health may, among other things, “require to be closed … all 
premises within the district … of any stated kind or description”. In reliance on this 
power, Order 1 purported to require the closure of all premises subject to certain listed 
exceptions, one of which was “premises necessary for the performance or delivery of 
essential businesses”. The term “essential businesses” was then defined to mean: 
businesses that are essential to the provision of the necessities of life and those 
businesses that support them, as described on the Essential Services list on the 
covid19.govt.nz internet site maintained by the New Zealand government. 
In practice, the content of that Essential Services list was overseen by the Ministry of 
Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) with input from officials across the 
government sector. This, argued Borrowdale, constituted an unlawful delegation of the 
Director-General’s s 70(1)(m) power. 
The High Court’s response to this claim was to deny that any delegation had occurred. 
To reach that conclusion, the Court had to read the definition of essential services in 
Order 1 as “stopping at the comma”.66 What came after the comma was “advisory” 
only.67 The Essential Services list was “not comprehensive” and “[a] business not listed 
on the website could still meet the definition”; if MBIE or others suggested otherwise, 
the business affected could have sought judicial review.68 
It seems to us that the speed with which the case was heard, combined with the 
applicant’s limited resources, made possible this somewhat unsatisfactory outcome. 
There was no affidavit evidence presented as to what MBIE had advised businesses 
seeking inclusion on the list, or as to the effect of their being excluded from it. This 
allowed the Court to treat that list as simply indicative, rather than exhaustive, of the 
sorts of businesses that were “essential”. 
We strongly suspect, however, this was not how matters were experienced by (for 
instance) independent greengrocers, butchers or even purveyors of knitting yarn.69 And 
the fact that liquor stores were publicly announced to be “non-essential” after Cabinet 
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rejected specific official advice to the contrary suggests it was the Director-General’s 
general definition that really was determining such matters.70 
The High Court’s willingness to embrace a strained ex-post-facto rationalisation that 
MBIE’s list was mere advice rather than determinative sits somewhat uneasily with its 
ready acceptance, in respect of the first cause of action, that members of the public 
should not have to look past government statements couched in peremptory language 
in order to question their legal basis.71 The stakes for affected businesses were 
extremely high – loss of livelihood and the very real prospect of criminal sanction. In 
that light, the Borrowdale Court’s suggestion that “there is force in the submission that 
if a particular business had to ask the question [whether it was essential], then it was 
probably excluded” seems rather glib.72 
One apparent consequence of the High Court’s ruling is that the District Court cannot 
now rely on the Essential Services list when determining, in the course of a prosecution, 
whether a business in fact delivers an essential service. We anticipate this will be cold 
comfort to those affected. 
CONCLUSION 
As noted above, the Borrowdale Court can take heart from a long line of common law 
cases evincing judicial deference to the Executive in times of emergency. It is notable, 
however, that once the moment of crisis has passed, it is not the majority opinions from 
these judgments that lodge in the legal imagination but the dissents.73 
It is hard not to sympathise with the difficult institutional position in which the 
Borrowdale Court found itself, and with its reluctance to undermine the social 
consensus surrounding a lockdown that it believed was normatively justified. We 
doubt, however, that Borrowdale will be looked back on by future generations as a 
high point for the judicial protection of the rule of law. 
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Postscript: Since the text of this article was finalised, Andrew Borrowdale has filed an 
appeal in the Court of Appeal against the High Court’s decision. It remains unheard at 
the time of publication. 
 
